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Abstract 
 
Do people move to cities because of marriage market considerations? In cities singles can 
meet more potential partners than in rural areas. Singles are therefore prepared to pay a 
premium in terms of higher housing prices. Once married, the marriage market benefits 
disappear while the housing premium remains. We extend the model of Burdett and Coles 
(1997) with a distinction between efficient (cities) and less efficient (non-cities) search 
markets. One implication of the model is that singles are more likely to move from rural areas 
to cities while married couples are more likely to make the reverse movement. A second 
prediction of the model is that attractive singles benefit most from a dense market (i.e. from 
being choosy). Those predictions are tested with a unique Danish dataset. 
JEL Code: J12, J64. 
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This paper tests whether cities can be viewed as marriage markets. The idea is simple.
Cities are dense areas where singles can meet more potential partners than in rural areas.
To enjoy these beneﬁts, they are willing to pay a premium in terms of higher housing
prices. Once married, the beneﬁts from meeting more potential partners vanish and
consequently, the countryside becomes more attractive. We extend the model of Burdett
and Coles (1997) with a distinction between eﬃcient cities and less eﬃcient rural search
markets. One obvious implication of the model is that singles are more likely to move
from rural areas to cities while couples arem o r el i k e l yt om a k et h er e v e r s em o v e m e n t .
This is exactly what we ﬁnd in the data. Note that this explanation implicitly uses an
increasing returns to scale (IRS) argument, namely that search is more eﬃcient in dense
areas. If this is the case and if utility is non-transferable, the above story is in particular
relevant for the most attractive types because they can be most choosy and therefore
beneﬁtm o s tf r o mah i g hc o n t a c tr a t e .
We use canonical correlations to create attractiveness indices which are a linear com-
bination of education, income, fathers education and fathers income. We ﬁnd that (1)
singles are more likely to move from the countryside to the city than couples, (2) couples
have the largest probability to make the reverse movement and (3) attractive singles are
more likely to move to the city than less attractive singles where the eﬀects are more
pronounced for females. We also test the sensitivity of our results to diﬀerent deﬁnitions
of attractiveness and cities. Moreover, we take sub-samples of individuals older than 25
to eliminate a potential college-eﬀect and of individuals who never have kids to control for
the possibility that children inﬂuence the moving decision. Our main results are robust
for those exclusions. Finally, we have repeated our analysis for individuals who have just
been divorced and ﬁnd that the probability of moving into the city is much larger than
the probability to move out of the city for those divorcees. We interpret those results
as evidence that our ﬁndings do not only reﬂect standard life cycle motives, i.e. that
older high income individuals have stronger preferences for space than young low income
individuals. If this were the case, they would remain in the countryside after a divorce.
There are a number of papers related to ours. Mincer (1978) argues that marriage
reduces mobility because the cost are higher for families. He ﬁnds support for this pattern
in US data. We must therefore allow singles and couples to have diﬀerent moving cost.
2Costa and Kahn (2000) argue that higher educated couples (power couples) are over-
represented in cities. The idea is that the colocation problem (both have to live close
to their job) is particularly severe for higher educated couples. Their model therefore
predicts that higher educated couples are more likely to move into the city and less likely
to move out of the city. In terms of the latter prediction our model predicts exactly the
opposite. Costa & Kahn (2000) use cross-section data from the U.S. Recently, Compton
& Pollak (2004) took another look at the issue. They argue, that another explanation
for the overrepresentation of power couples in the large cities is that all college educated
individuals, married and unmarried, are attracted to the amenities and high returns to
education of the large cities. As a result of this, the formation of power couples is more
likely to occur in larger than smaller metropolitan areas. Their explanation is related to
our hypothesis. Based on PSID data, they analyze the dynamic patterns of migration,
marriage, divorce, and education in relation to city size and ﬁnd that power couples are
not more likely to migrate to the largest cities in the U.S. than part-power couples or
power singles. Instead, the location trends are better explained by the higher rate of
power couple formation in larger metropolitan areas. Our results are in line with Comp-
ton & Pollak (2004). With the Danish data we also ﬁn dt h a tt h em a r r i a g em a r k e tr o l e
of cities is more important than the colocation of job opportunities. High skilled singles
move to the city but once they are married they are more likely to move out of the city.
Goldin & Katz (2002) discuss how the introduction of the birth control pill changed
the career and marriage decision of women. They argue that there is a direct and an
indirect eﬀect of the pill. The direct eﬀect is that the pill lowered the costs of engaging
in long-term career investments by giving women more certainty regarding the pregnancy
consequences of sex. The indirect eﬀect works through the marriage market. Since age
of marriage increased in the aftermath of the diﬀusion of the pill the marriage market
for educated women thickened. They were more likely to ﬁnd suitable partners during
their time in college or thereafter. The pill was according to Goldin & Katz (2002) a
crucial factor in terms of allowing women to take an education without loosing out in the
m a r r i a g em a r k e t .I nf a c t ,a sd i s c u s s e dm o r et h o roughly in Goldin (1992), going to college
actually increased the chances for women of marrying a more educated and hence more
wealthy husband. In this respect colleges and universities play the same role as cities do
in our paper.
3Black et al. (2002) suggest that the reason a city like San Francisco hosts a dispropor-
tional high number of gays is due the high housing cost of living there. San Francisco is
known as one of America’s loveliest cities. Hence, due to high demand for housing in San
Francisco, housing prices are high. Gay couples face constraints that make having chil-
dren more costly for them than for similar heterosexual couples. This frees resources for
other “goods” such as housing in high-amenity locations. Although we do not explicitly
consider the gay mating market, our model suggests an alternative explanation. Since the
market for gays is relatively thin, they gain a lot by moving to a dense market like cities.
In addition, any area that happens to have a large gay community will attract more gays
because the matching rate depends not only on the contact rate but also on the share of
potential mates.
Edlund (2004) argues that young women outnumber young men in urban areas. The
argument is that urban areas oﬀer skilled workers better labor markets. Assuming that
there are more skilled males than females, this alone would predict a surplus of males.
However, the presence of males with high incomes may attract not only skilled females but
also unskilled females, and thus a surplus of females in urban areas from the combination
of better labor and marriage markets. We do not ﬁnd evidence for this.
Finally, Teulings and Gautier (2004) argued in a labor market context with transferable
utility that cities have a comparative advantage in producing “search intensive” goods,
that is, goods that require a large mix of labor inputs.
The paper is organized as follows. First, in section 2 we present a simple marriage
market model. In section 3 we discuss the data. Section 4 presents the main estimation
results. Section 5 carries out a number of robustness checks and section 6 concludes.
2 The model
T h em a r r i a g em a r k e tt h a tw ec o n s i d e ri si nt h es p i r i to fB u r d e t ta n dC o l e s( 1 9 9 7 ) .W e
treat males and females symmetrically to save on notation. For convenience, we discuss the
marriage decision problem from the female point of view. By our symmetry assumption,
the solution carries over to males. Our economy is made up of two regions or locations,
the countryside and the city. All agents have identical preferences but they diﬀer in
terms of their attractiveness as a marriage partner. Divorces are ruled out, marriage is an
absorbing state. We study the behavior of a cohort of single females entering the marriage
4market at a particular point in time: when do they marry? with whom do they marry?
and ﬁnally, where do they look for a partner?
Let r be the rank order of a person, r =1being the most attractive individual and
r =0being the least attractive individual and let a(r) be the attractiveness of a person
as a function of his or her rank r. By construction, r is distributed uniformly between
0 and 1 among the inﬂow of singles.1 The level of inﬂow of single women is normalized
to one in each location. We assume a(·) to be strictly positive, strictly increasing and
diﬀerentiable. Hence:
A1:a(0) > 0
A2:a
0(·) > 0
Assume that utility is non-transferable and that the lifetime utility of a married person is
equal to the attractiveness a of her partner.2 The ﬂow utility of a single person is equal to
zero. Hence, Assumption A1 states that no type strictly prefers to be single. Assumption
A2 states that each female’s utility is increasing in her partner’s attractiveness. Let l be
the place of residence for an individual (0=countryside, 1=city) Let Fl be the stock
of singles per unit of inﬂow of singles at location l and let fl (r) be the density of rank
r singles at location l.I fa l lr a n k sr marry equally fast, and if all ranks are distributed
proportionally across both locations, than this density function is uniform: fl (r)=1for
all r and for l =0 ,1. By symmetry, the distributions are equal for females and males.
The arrival rate of marriage opportunities for a female of rank r with males of rank rm
is λlFlfl(rm),w h e r e0 <λ 0 <λ 1. This arrival rate follows from a quadratic contact
technology, where the number of contacts is proportional to the product of the number
of males and females. This technology exhibits increasing returns to scale (IRS).3 This
1Hence, we deviate from a common but unpleasant simpliﬁcation in the literature which is the cloning
assumption: each person who gets married is immediately replaced by another person of the same at-
tractiveness, see e.g. Bloch and Ryder (2000). That assumption ﬁxes the distribution of attractiveness
over the stock instead of over the inﬂow.
2Utility depends only on the characteristics of one’s partner. Speciﬁcations where the own type matters
in an additive way do not change the results, i.e. a female with attrictiveness af married to a male am
receiving utility, u = am + h(af),w i t hh0 > 0. In the words of Burdett and Coles (1999): “narcissm is
not necessarily ruled out”.
3Our argument for using a quadratic contact technology with IRS is that CRS has the unrealistic
property that there would be congestion in the marriage opportunities of Brad Pitt if the authors of this
paper would move to Beverly Hills. See Teulings and Gautier (2004: 567) for a discussion of this issue in
the context of the labor market.
5IRS feature of the contact technology makes the contact rate higher in the city than on
t h ec o u n t r y s i d e .A s s u m et h a tt h e r ea r en om o v i n gc o s t .L e tc be the excess cost of urban
live, c>0, and normalize the cost of rural life to 0. To keep things as simple as possible,
we assume that c enters additively in the utility ﬂow of a person. This additional cost can
be thought of as the cost of living in a crowded area due to the rents that are extracted
by the owners of scarce real estate in the city. For singles, living in the city has the
advantage of meeting more potential partners. This advantage may or may not oﬀset
c. However, couples loose the beneﬁts of living in the city but must still pay the higher
rents. Therefore, they move to the countryside directly after marriage. Let ρ be the rate
of time preference. Then, the Bellman equation for the expected lifetime utility, u(r,l),
of a single female of rank r living in location l reads:
u(r,l)=ψlFl
Z
ml(r)
fl (rm)a(rm)drm − lc (1)
where ψl ≡ λl/ρ (hence: 0 <ψ 0 <ψ 1)a n dml (r) is the marriage set consisting of all male
ranks {rm} with whom a female of type r is willing and able to marry with. A marriage
opportunity is only realized by mutual agreement. Hence, for both partners, the lifetime
utility of being married to a partner of rank rm must be greater than the lifetime utility
of being single:
rm ∈ ml (r) ⇔ rm ∈ ml (r) ⇔
C1:u(r,l) <a(rm) ∧
C2:u(rm,l) <a(r)
These two conditions reﬂect the non-transferability of utility: condition C1 states that a
female of rank r must be willing to marry a male of rank rm, C2 states that r must be
able to marry rm, that is a male of rank rm must be willing to marry a female of rank r.
By symmetry, the marriage set of a male of rank rm is the same, ml (rm)
Deﬁnition 1. Equilibrium in a location l is a collection of marriage sets ml (r) that
satisﬁes conditions C1 and C2.
Below, we ﬁrst characterize the equilibrium in a single location. Then, we turn our
attention to the central theme of the paper: the sorting of singles and couples into cities
and rural areas.
62.1 Characterization of the equilibrium
The shape of the marriage sets is determined by a number of simple observations. First,
if a female of rank r is willing to marry a male of a particular rank r∗
m, then she is willing
to marry with any higher ranked male than r∗
m. Formally: if, for a particular r,c o n d i t i o n
C1 is satisﬁed for r∗
m,t h e ni ti ss a t i s ﬁed for any rm ≥ r∗
m by assumption A2. Second, the
utility of a single u(r,l) is weakly increasing in r, as can be seen from equation (1): by
our symmetry assumption, each male type that is willing to marry with a female of type
r is also willing to marry with higher r types. Hence, the matching set of more attractive
females is at least as good as the matching set of less attractive females. Third, by the
previous two arguments, the marriage set of a female of type r is convex, where the lower
bound r
−
l (r) is determined by the lowest male type to which that female is willing to
marry to and where the upper bound r
+
l (r) is determined by the highest male type that
is willing to marry her. In other words, the lower bound is the rank rm for which condition
C1 is just violated (i.e. holds by equality), the upper bound is the highest rank rm for
which condition C2 is just violated (i.e. holds by equality).
Hence, the marriage set of a female of type r is deﬁned as {rm} ∈ hr
−
l (r),r
+
l (r)].S i n c e
these conditions apply for females and males symmetrically, we can leave out the gender
index in the upper and lower bound functions. By the same argument, a male with the
same rank as a female is always part of the marriage set of that female: r ∈ hr
−
l (r),r
+
l (r)].
If that would not be the case the condition of mutual approval would not be satisﬁed.
Now, consider the most attractive female, r =1 . By the previous argument, all males
are willing to marry her, so the upper bound of her marriage set is rm =1 .T h e l o w e r
bound of her marriage set, denoted r1
l , is determined by the lowest ranked male that gives
h e rm o r eu t i l i t yt h a ns h ew o u l dg e tw h e nr e m aining single and keeping the option value
of continued search. Combining (1) and the equality version of C1 determines r1
l as the
ﬁxed point of:
a
¡
r
1
l
¢
= ψlFl
Z 1
r1
l
fl (rm)a(rm)drm − lc (2)
It is easily veriﬁed that all single women with rank{r} ∈ hr1
l ,1] set the lower bound of their
marriage set at the same value as the most attractive type because they solve exactly the
same problem. Hence, all these single women have the same utility, u(r,l)=u(1,l),∀r ∈
hr1
l ,1]. By symmetry, the same applies for males. The females and males with rank {r}
7∈ hr1
l ,1] form a closed segment and marry with each other, but they do not marry with
anybody else. A woman of type r1
l can therefore not marry with a higher type. Her own
type is the upper bound of her marriage set. The whole logic that applies to the highest
segment therefore carries over to the next segment. The lower bound of the next segment,
r2
l can be calculated in a similar way as r1
l .
a
¡
r
2
l
¢
= ψlFl
Z r1
l
r2
l
fl (rm)a(rm)drm − lc
The whole market falls apart in a number of consecutive, non overlapping segments.
Agents marry with all ranks within their own segment and never marry outside their
segment. The full set of upper and lower bounds can be calculated recursively by the
following algorithm:
r
0
l ≡ 1
a
¡
r
i
l
¢
= ψlFl
Z r
i−1
l
ri
l
fl (rm)a(rm)drm − lc (3)
except for the lowest segment which is treated separately below. The ﬁn a ls t e pi nt h e
characterization of the equilibrium is the derivation of the density of single males fl (rm)
by an equilibrium ﬂow condition:
1=λlFlfl (rm)
Z ri−1
l
ri
l
Flfl (r)dr,∀rm ∈ hr
i
l,r
i−1
l ]
T h el h si st h ei n ﬂow (which we normalized to 1), the rhs is the outﬂow of type r.S i n c e
all females within a segment follow the same strategy, their expected search time length is
the same, and hence the density of their ranks is the same. Hence, the integral simpliﬁes
to Flfl (r)
£
r
i−1
l − ri
l
¤
. By the same argument, and by the symmetry between males and
females, fl (r)=fl (rm),f o rr and rm belonging to the same segment. Hence:
fl (rm)=
·
Fl
q
λl
¡
r
i−1
l − ri
l
¢¸−1
,r m ∈ hr
i
l,r
i−1
l ] (4)
Fl =
p
λl
−1
The density in segment i is therefore negatively related to the width of the marriage set
r
i−1
l − ri
l, but less than proportional, since the lower density itself partially oﬀsets the
8negative impact of the wider matching set because in a non dense segment fewer types
get married.
The above argument leads to the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 An equilibrium in the marriage market is a collection of connected
non overlapping segments such that the lower bound ri
l of each segment i at region l is
the upper bound of the next segment. The lower bounds, ri
l of segments i are determined
recursively by the following algorithm:
r
0
l ≡ 1
A(r) ≡
Z 1
r
a(rm)drm
u
¡
r
i
l,l
¢
≡ ψl
A(ri
l) − A
¡
r
i−1
l
¢
q
r
i−1
l − ri
l
− lc (5)
a
¡
r
i
l
¢
≥ u
¡
r
i
l,l
¢
where the inequality applies only if ri
l =0 . An equilibrium exists, but need not be unique.
Proof:
Combining equations (1) and (4) yields equation (5). Consider segment i.F o r t h i s
segment, r
i−1
l is given (implicitly), either by equation (5) for segment i−1 for i>1,o rb y
r0
l ≡ 1 for i =1 .C o n s i d e rt h el o w e rb o u n dri
l. u(ri
l,l) is continuous in ri
l, u(ri
l,l)=0for
ri
l = r
i−1
l ,a n du(ri
l,l) > 0 for ri
l <r
i−1
l . Hence, either u(ri
l,l) is equal to a(ri
l) for some
ri
l,0 <r i
l <r
i−1
l , yielding an equilibrium, or it is not, but then a(0) >u(0,l),s ot h a t
ri
l =0is an equilibrium. Partially diﬀerentiating equation (5) with respect to ri
l yields:
∂ [a(ri
l) − u(ri
l,l)]
∂ri
l
= a
0 ¡
r
i
l
¢
+
ψl
2
q
r
i−1
l − ri
l
"
2a
¡
r
i
l
¢
−
A(ri
l) − A
¡
r
i−1
l
¢
r
i−1
l − ri
l
#
The ﬁrst term and the ﬁrst term between square brackets are positive by Assumption A1
and A2. The second term between square brackets is negative. By the deﬁnition of A(·),
we have:
a
¡
r
i
l
¢
<
A(ri
l) − A
¡
r
i−1
l
¢
r
i−1
l − ri
l
<a
¡
r
i−1
l
¢
Hence, for a suﬃciently low a0 (ri
l) and for a value of a
¡
r
i−1
l
¢
at least twice as large as
a(ri
l), this derivative becomes negative. Therefore, there may be multiple ﬁxed points.¥
9The equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1 for the case that there are only three seg-
ments. Panel A shows the segments in the rank space of males and females. The segments
are given by the shaded areas. Panel B shows the relationship between a woman’s attrac-
tiveness and her utility when being single. By symmetry, the relation for males is exactly
the same. For this ﬁgure, it is convenient to deﬁne the boundaries in terms of attrac-
tiveness instead of rank: ai
l ≡ a(ri
l) and to write utility as a function of attractiveness:
u[a(r),l] ≡ u(r,l). The expected utility of all women in the ﬁrst segment, i =1 ,i se q u a l
to the attractiveness of the least attractive woman in the segment, a1
l, because all males
in the ﬁrst segment are indiﬀerent between marrying this woman and remaining single.
Since by symmetry, the utility of the least attractive male in the segment is equal to the
utility of the least attractive female, the attractiveness of the least attractive female is
equal to her utility as a single. In a “Walrasian” marriage market without search cost,
the utility of a single equals her attractiveness for all ranks, because each rank forms a
separate segment and marriage sets are reduced to singletons (Gale & Shapley, 1962). In
terms of panel A, all matches will be on the diagonal. The shaded surface between the
diagonal u = a and the actual utility, u(a,l)in panel B can be viewed of as a measure of
the cost of search frictions. Only for the least attractive single woman in each segment
her utility is equal to what it would be in a “Walrasian” market. For her, the cost of
waiting for a suitable marriage partner is exactly oﬀset by the chance of ﬁnding a better
partner than she would have been able to ﬁnd in a “Walrasian” market. A slight change
in the segmentation would therefore make her worse oﬀ, since she would no longer be
the least attractive woman in a her segment, and hence she would get a lower pay oﬀ
than in the “Walrasian equilibrium”. Hence, there is no unambiguous Pareto ranking for
equilibria with a diﬀerent number of segments. This feature complicates the comparative
statics analysis in the next section. However, there is a one-to-one relation between the
size of a segment and the utility of the highest ranked woman. She is always part of the
ﬁrst segment. The more exclusive this segment, the higher the attractiveness of the least
attractive woman in this segment is, and as a result, the higher is the utility of a single in
that segment. The negative relation between segment size and the utility of being single
applies for the “average” cost of search across all attractiveness levels: the smaller the
segments, the smaller the surface between the diagonal and the actual utility in Panel B,
and the smaller therefore the cost of search.
10females
males
r2 r0
r2
r1
r1
r0
r3
r3
Panel A
a
u(1)
us(r2)
us(r1)
a(r2)a ( r 1)
Panel B
Figure 1, Marriage market segments
11Figure 2 plots for location l =0the utility u(ri
0,0) of a female in segment i as a function
of the lower bound ri
0 of that segment (the ﬁgure for l =1is essentially the same). If the
lower bound were equal to the upper bound, it would take the woman forever to ﬁnd a
male of this type, so u(ri−1,0) = 0. If she sets her lower bound at 0, she will marry very
fast but possibly below her league, u(0) ≥ 0.T h ea(ri) curve gives the attractiveness of
the lowest type in the segment which is strictly positive and increasing by Assumption
A1 and A2. An equilibrium requires a(ri
0) ≥ u(ri
0,0), where the inequality can only apply
for ri
0 =0 . T h i si sg e n e r i c a l l yt h ec a s ef o rt h el o w e s ts e g m e n ti nt h em a r k e t . P a n e lA ,
B, and C show three possible cases. In Panel A, there is a unique interior equilibrium,
point E. In Panel B, there is no interior equilibrium, so that ri
0 =0 . In Panel C, there
a r em u l t i p l ee q u i l i b r i a .
ri
a(ri)
u(ri)
ri-1
0
.
E1
Panel A
12ri
a(ri)
u(ri)
ri-1
0
Panel B
ri
a(ri)
u(ri)
ri-1
0
.
E3 .
.
. E4
E2
E1 .
E5
Panel C
Figure 2. Equilibria
The intuition for the multiplicity of equilibria is that if all women use a non-selective
acceptance strategy, where they also marry with unattractive males, they all marry fast.
By symmetry, this implies that males do the same. Hence, everybody marries fast and the
13stock of singles is small. This reduces the probability of ﬁnding a really attractive male,
and hence the non-selective acceptance strategy is the rational choice for each individual.
However, if the most attractive agents in the segment are all selective, then they stay
single for a longer period. This raises the probability of ﬁnding an attractive partner,
and hence the selective strategy is an equilibrium as well. By the switch to this more
selective marriage strategy, some less attractive agents fall out of the segment, and they
have to form a new segment of their own. Some of them are likely to be worse oﬀ.B y
the mutual agreement requirement for marriage, the role of these less attractive women in
this strategy shift is entirely passive. There is nothing that they can do to stop this shift.
The existence of multiple equilibria is due to a standard thick market externality, see
Diamond (1982). The investment in search activities by attractive males has a positive
eﬀect on the search activities of attractive females, and the other way around. Hence, if
females invest more in search, search becomes more attractive for males and vice versa.
For reasons discussed before, there is no unambiguous Pareto ranking of the various
equilibria in Panel C.
A planner who would give all individuals the same weight would simply maximize
the total number of marriages and would create one big segment. This would however
be the most unfavorable outcome for the most attractive types. They are best of when
the segments are as small as possible. Below, we introduce the notion of hierarchical
eﬃciency.
Deﬁnition 2. An hierarchically eﬃcient equilibrium is an equilibrium where the ex-
pected utility of no single with rank r∗ can be improved without making a higher ranked
single r>r ∗ worse oﬀ.
The hierarchically eﬃcient equilibrium, E5, in Panel C is the equilibrium with the
smallest segments. The higher ri
0, the higher a(ri
0), and hence the higher the utility of
the highest rank in the segment, r
i−1
0 . In what follows, we focus on this hierarchically
eﬃcient equilibrium because this is the only equilibrium for which there exists no proﬁtable
deviation of a coalition of agents. In all other equilibria, there exists such a proﬁtable
deviation. I.e. in E4, the highest types would be better of if they would all be more
selective.
As shown in Panel C, the following lemma applies for an hierarchically eﬃcient equi-
librium:
14Lemma
In an hierarchically eﬃcient equilibrium, we have:
∂ [a(ri
l) − u(ri
l,0)]
∂ri
l
≥ 0
where strict inequality holds generically.
The non-ambiguity of this partial derivative with respect to ri
l will be helpful for the
comparative statics to be discussed in the next section.4
2.2 Comparing the city to the countryside
Proposition 2 Consider an hierarchically eﬃcient equilibrium. Taking the upper bound
r
i−1
l of segment i as given, an increase in ψl raises the lower bound ri
l of segment i.
Proof. Totally diﬀerentiating equation (5) and rearranging terms yields:
∂ [a(ri
l) − u(ri
l,0)]
∂ri
l
dr
i
l −
a(ri
l)+lc
ψl
dψl =0
Hence, dri
l/dψl > 0.¥
Proposition 2 tells us that market segmentation increases when ψl goes up. The reason
for this phenomenon is obvious: when search becomes more eﬃcient, people become
more selective in choosing a marriage partner. Since ψl is larger in the city than in the
countryside, our model predicts that market segmentation will be tighter in the city than
on the countryside.
Proposition 3. Consider an hierarchically eﬃcient equilibrium. Suppose agents
choose recursively whether to locate in the city or in the countryside. That is, ﬁrst, the
highest ranks make their location choice l =0or 1 and choose their acceptance threshold
for a marriage partner of the opposite sex, r1
l . Then, the next highest ranks r ≤ r1
l make
their choice, and so on, and so forth, till all ranks have made a location and threshold
choice. Then, there exists a critical rank r∗ such that all r ≤ r∗ prefer location l =0and
all r>r ∗ prefer location l =1 .
Proof. Suppose that the rank ri−1 (we leave out the location index of the previous
segment, since that is irrelevant at this stage) is the highest rank who has not decided
4Burdett and Coles (1997) take an alternative approach to this problem by deriving conditions on a(·)
for a unique equilibrium.
15yet where to locate (by the recursive decision making, higher ranks have already decided
by the same procedure as described here). This rank will choose location according to
a(ri
1) ≷ a(ri
0). Suppose that a(ri
1) >a (ri
0), and hence ri
1 >r i
0,s ot h a tr a n kri−1 will
choose the location l =1 .T h e n ,a l lr a n k sr ∈ hri−1,r i
1] will choose location l =1since
that gives them the highest utility a(ri
1). For these ranks to prefer l =1 ,i tm u s tb et r u e
that:
0 < (ψ1 − ψ0)
A(ri
1) − A(ri−1)
p
r
i−1
1 − ri − c (6)
Mutatis mutandis the same applies for the reverse case a(ri
0) >a(ri
1):
0 ≥ (ψ1 − ψ0)
A(ri
0) − A(ri−1)
p
r
i−1
0 − ri − c (7)
At the margin there is an agent who is just indiﬀerent between l =0or 1. In that case,
ri
0 = ri
1 ≡ r∗, and the above condition holds with equality. Substitution of equation (5)
for l =0yields an implicit solution for r∗:
ψ1 − ψ0
ψ0
a(r
∗)=c
Since a(·) is monotonically increasing by Assumption A2, this equation can have at most
one interior solution. It is easy to see that for any r>r ∗, equation (6) applies, and
that for any r<r ∗, equation (7) applies. If there is no interior solution for r,e i t h e r
everybody prefers the city, or everybody prefers the countryside, which does not violate
the proposition.¥
Proposition 3 shows that the most attractive women prefer the city and the least
attractive women prefer the countryside unless the city premium is so low that everybody
prefers the city or so high that everybody prefers the countryside. We label this outcome
the elite city ordering. The elite prefers the eﬃciency of the city marriage market above
the cheap cost of living in the countryside, because they gain more by a higher contact
rate than the lower types. Their high attractiveness allows them to marry with attractive
partners. This raises the expected diﬀerence in the utility ﬂow of being married versus
being single. Hence, they have a greater interest in an eﬃcient marriage market than
the lower ranks. Note, however, that the greater interest in getting married does not
necessarily imply that they marry faster. If the “spread” in marriage opportunities is
greater among the elite (that is, a00 (r) À 0), this elite will have a large incentive to be
16selective in their acceptance strategy, and hence it will take them a long time to ﬁnd a
suitable partner.
It is tempting to jump from this result to the general conclusion that Elite city ordering
will always be the natural outcome. This is not the case since there may exist multiple
equilibria. For example, if all attractive singles move to the countryside, than it does not
make sense for an individual attractive single to move to the city, since she will not ﬁnd
a suitable marriage partner there. Indeed, all attractive singles would gain if they could
coordinate on moving to the city, but for an individual woman it is not rational to deviate
from the strategy of the rest of the segment. Hence, there are stable equilibria that do
not ﬁt the elite city ordering. However, Proposition 3 describes the only equilibrium that
is hierarchically eﬃcient.
The elite city ordering exists only for a suitable level of c, the excess cost of living in
ac i t y .I fc is too high, everybody prefers the countryside since cities are too expensive to
live in. If c is too low, each single prefers the city to take advantage of the higher contact
rate. Now the question remains whether there exists a mechanism that guarantees the
value c to be in this critical intermediate range? The answer is: yes, there is. Part of the
excess cost of living in a city are the rents that are extracted by the owners of real estate
in the city. These owners are able to collect those rents because the city is a more eﬃcient
place to ﬁnd a marriage partner. Because the value of a suitable partner is higher for the
more attractive singles, this group beneﬁts in particular from moving to the city. If there
is some capacity constraint on living in the city, the laws of supply and demand guarantee
that c settles at a level that induces only the most attractive singles to move to the city.
We can summarize the empirical predictions as follows. First, to the extent that there
is no sorting of attractiveness types between locations, the segmentation of the marriage
market is coarser in the city than in the countryside, leading to a higher rank correlation
of the attractiveness levels of married couples. Second, the comparative advantage of a
city is its higher contact rate. For married couples, who have no particular reason to
prefer the city above the countryside, the excess cost makes cities an unattractive place
to be. Hence, we expect singles to move to the city and married couples to move out.
Third, this prediction holds in particular for the most attractive singles, who are able to
m a r r yt h em o s ta t t r a c t i v ep a r t n e r sa n dw h oa r et h e r e f o r em o s tw i l l i n gt op a yt h eh i g h e r
cost of living. Therefore, this group is most likely to move to the city.
173D a t a
The data that we use to test the main implications of the model come from IDA (Integrated
Database for Labor Market Research) created by Statistics Denmark. The information
comes from various administrative registers that are merged in Statistics Denmark. The
IDA sample used here contains (among other things) information on marriage market
conditions for a randomly drawn sub-sample of all individuals born between January 1,
1955 and January 1, 1965. The individuals are followed from 1980 to 1995. The data
set enables us to identify individual transitions between diﬀerent states on the marriage
market on an annual basis. In addition we have information about current geographical
location. This implies that we observe an individual’s mobility pattern on an annual basis.
If the individual enters a relationship we also observe the personal characteristics of the
partner. There are 21840 individuals in our sample. We use the following variables:
Education. We deﬁne three types of individuals according to their level of education.
Since most of the sample is acquiring education in the sample period we will use level of
education in 1995 (when the youngest person in the sample was 30) as the indicator for
level of education (to avoid problems with unﬁnished education). Individuals with low
levels of education have no education beyond elementary school; individuals with medium
levels are vocationally trained, and individuals with high levels of education have taken
some kind of further education.
Income. We use (log) gross income. The income ﬁgures are all in terms of 1980
prices. The consumer price index is used as a deﬂator. For individuals with missing
incomes we ﬁx log income at 0 and include a dummy variable for missing income.
City- rural deﬁnition. We divide Denmark into cities and rural areas. The ﬁve
largest Danish cities are Copenhagen (incl. Frederiksberg), Aarhus, Odense, Aalborg, and
Esbjerg.
The most dense area in Denmark is the Copenhagen metropolitan area. 12.7 % of
the population lived there in 1995. The other cities host 15% of the population in 1995.
The ﬁve cities are distributed across the country as shown in Figure 3. We therefore
conjecture that the relevant city deﬁnition is to include the largest cities in each region
of Denmark. We repeat our analysis with a diﬀerent deﬁnition of dense and non-dense
areas based on the population density. This changes the city deﬁnition somewhat. Some
suburbs of Copenhagen are more densely populated than the large cities. It turns out
18however, that our main results are robust to changes in the city deﬁnition.
Figure 3 Map of Denmark
Marriage. Individuals can occupy one of three states in the marriage market: single,
cohabiting, or married. In this paper we merge cohabitation and marriage into one group
and refer to this group as married. Cohabitation as either a prelude to or a substitute of
marriage is very common in Denmark (see e.g. Svarer, 2004). There are some qualiﬁca-
t i o n st ot h i sd e ﬁnition of marriage. Some of the couples - presumably a small minority
- that are registered as cohabiting are simply sharing a housing unit, and do not live
together as a married couple.
Personal characteristics. In addition to the information presented above we also
have detailed information about the number of kids in the household. We know the
labor market status of the individuals, their age and their income. In addition, we have
information on the income and education of the father of each individual in the sample.
19Table 1: Descriptive statistics (in 1987)
City Rural
Women Men Women Men
Number of observations 3612 3815 7920 8325
Single (%) 46.3 55.4 26.0 44.0
Children (%) 35.4 19.3 56.2 33.3
Age (in years) 26.4 26.7 27.0 26.9
Low level of education (%) 44.9 40.6 39.8 34.5
Medium level of education (%) 34.3 40.0 46.0 53.6
High level of education (%) 20.8 19.4 14.2 11.9
Gross income (in 1,000 dkk) 188.5 246.7 176.2 249.6
Father’s gross income (in 1,000 dkk) 150.1 109.0 124.8 104.6
Missing income (%) 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.4
Father has missing income (%) 35.7 34.8 35.4 31.7
Divorced last year (%) 6.0 5.5 4.0 4.0
Moved from rural to city (%) 3.3
Moved from city to rural (%) 7.6
Note: Numbers represent percentages - unless stated otherwise.
As expected we see more single individuals in the city and more people without kids.
The age diﬀerence between the two regions is quite small, though. People tend to be more
educated in the city. The fraction of divorcees is slightly larger in the city. Table 1 also
reveals that men marry later because the cohort contains relatively many single men.
3.0.1 Constructing a measure of attractiveness
The model presented in Section 2 suggests that more attractive singles are more likely
to move to the city. Individual attractiveness presumably depends on a whole range of
characteristics like weight, height, age, intelligence, humor, physical appearance, income
etc. Obvious data limitations restrict us from using a complete set of personal attributes.
Regrettably, pictures of the individuals in the sample are not available, so that we cannot
rank individual according to their looks, as in e.g. Hamermesh & Biddle (1994). We
therefore follow Wong (2003) and Anderberg (2004) and use income and education as
attractiveness components. In addition we also exploit information on father’s level of
education and income.5 Below, we explain how we determine their relative importance. In
a frictionless world, the most attractive females marry the most attractive males, resulting
5If the common wisdom that rich males marry attractive females is true than fathers income will be
correlated with physical attractiveness.
20in a perfect correlation between male and female attractiveness. In a world with frictions
this correlation will not be equal to one but it will be positive. Here, we conjecture that
attractiveness for both males (AM)a n df e m a l e s( AF)i sal i n e a rf u n c t i o no ft h ef o u rf a c t o r s
described above and the dummies for missing income.6
A
F = edu ∗ α1 +l n ( inc) ∗ α2 + f_edu ∗ α3 +l n ( f_inc) ∗ α4
+miss_inc ∗ α5 + f_miss_inc ∗ α6
A
M = edu ∗ β1 +l n ( inc) ∗ β2 + f_edu ∗ β3 +l n ( f_inc) ∗ β4
+miss_inc ∗ β5 + f_miss_inc ∗ β6.
We estimate the relative importance of those factors (the α0s and the β
0s) by canonical
correlation, as was already suggested by Becker (1973). Canonical correlations (see e.g.
Johnson & Wichern (1998)) construct several indices of AF and AM such that the cor-
relation between each of them is maximized subject to the indices being orthogonal to
each other. In the model we assume that the two sets of variables are related to each
other only through a single index. In Table 2 we present the results from the canonical
correlation analysis.
All estimated coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In order to determine the
relative importance of the underlying variables, we also report the canonical coeﬃcients
of the standardized variables. The standardized coeﬃcients show that the attractiveness
level is mainly determined by education. Further, note that father’s income is more
important factor for female attractiveness than for males while the reverse holds for own
income. The ﬁrst canonical root is 0.36 and although the second is signiﬁcantly positive
it is much smaller. Hence, the ﬁrst canonical correlation captures most of the correlation
b e t w e e nt h et w os e t so fv a r i a b l e sa n dw ec a nu s eas i n g l ei n d e x .
6We did not include age because it is likely that preferences are based on age diﬀerences between own’s
and partner’s type rather than the absolute value of age.
21Table 2: Results from canonical correlations
Canonical t-value Standardized
coeﬃcients canonical
coeﬃcients
α1 : Man’s education 1.02 21.1 0.69
α2 : Man’s father’s education 0.51 10.5 0.36
α3 : Man’s income 0.43 6.1 0.31
α4 : M a n ’ sf a t h e r ’ si n c o m e 0 . 3 3 6 . 4 0 . 2 6
α5 : Man has missing income 5.39 4.8 0.24
α6 : Man’s father has missing income 3.77 3.6 0.01
β1 : Woman’s education 1.03 23.0 0.75
β2 : Woman’s father’s education 0.41 8.6 0.29
β3 : Woman’s income 0.22 3.8 0.18
β4 : Woman’s father’s income 0.47 9.1 0.45
β5 : Woman has missing income 3.41 3.7 0.17
β6 : Woman’s father has missing income 4.91 5.9 0.29
1. canonical correlation between AM and AF 0.36 34.1
2. canonical correlation between AM and AF 0.09 7.4
#c o u p l e s 7 6754
Note: All weights are signiﬁcant diﬀerent from 0 at the 5% level.
Based on the estimated weights we construct an attractiveness number for each indi-
vidual by adding up the weighted values of their characteristics. The summary statistics
for the attractiveness index (singles only) for both cities and rural areas are:8
Table 3: Summary statistics for the standardized attractiveness
measure
Singles
Mean Std. Dev.
Rural
Male attractiveness -0.107 0.986
Female attractiveness -0.032 0.982
City
Male attractiveness 0.256 1.099
Female attractiveness 0.366 1.061
Note: A t-test cannot reject that attractiveness is higher
in the city for both genders at the 1% level.
7For some couples fathers education and income is missing. These couples are dropped in the canonical
analysis.
8The attractiveness measure is constructed based on 1995 observations. The results throughout the
paper are however unaﬀected if we use each year’s income to construct the measure.
22The fact that higher single types are more likely to live in the city is by itself consistent
with our model but also consistent with many other stories. In the next section we try to
isolate the marriage market eﬀect from other motivations to live in the city.
4 Estimation results
In this section we provide evidence for the main implications of the model. We allow all
agents who enter the marriage market to have idiosyncratic utility, γ0, for the countryside
and, γ1, for the city. Both are assumed to be independent of one’s attractiveness. Let X be
a set of controls like age, having children, and working full-time. A denotes attractiveness.
To save on notation we leave out the subscripts M and F here. We include a cross term
of attractiveness and single status, S.L e tU0, the utility of living in the countryside be
determined by:
U0 = µ1X + µ2S + µ3A + µ4S · A + γ0,
and let U1, the utility of living in the city, be determined by:
U1 = χ1X + χ2S + χ3A + χ4S · A + γ1.
The main prediction of the model is that χ2 is positive (being single increases the utility of
living in the city) and that χ4 is positive (in particular attractive people move to the city).
We allow the moving cost, C, either from countryside to city or from city to countryside
to depend on personnel characteristics and marital status:
C = ϕ1X + ϕ2S + e
Let M01 = U1−U0−C,b et h en e tb e n e ﬁt of moving from the countryside to the city and
let M10 = U0−U1−C,b et h en e tb e n e ﬁt of moving from the he city to the countryside. If
M01 > 0, individuals move from the countryside to the city while if M10 > 0, individuals
move from the city to the countryside. We then estimate the following equations
M
01 = β
01
1 X + β
01
2 S + β
01
3 A + β
01
4 S · A + γ
01 (8)
M
10 = β
10
1 X + β
10
2 S + β
10
3 A + β
10
4 S · A + γ
10 (9)
where γ01 = γ1−γ0−e,a n dγ10 = γ0−γ1−e are type-1-extreme-value distributed random
variables. Individuals with a high γ01 and a low γ10 have strong idiosyncratic preferences
23for the city while individuals with a low γ01 and a high γ10 have strong idiosyncratic
preferences for the countryside. Individuals who have both a low γ01 and a low γ10are
immobile. If we would only consider (8), then a positive value for β
01
2 would be only weak
evidence for our model because it tells us that either attractive singles have preferences for
the city or couples have higher moving cost. However if we ﬁnd that β
01
2 > 0 and β
10
2 < 0
t h i sw o u l db es t r o n ge v i d e n c ei nf a v o ro fo u rm o d e lb e c a u s ei ti m p l i e st h a tU1−U0 > 0 for
singles and U1−U0 < 0 for couples. Below we summarize the predictions of our model: i)
β
01
2 > 0 ii) β
10
2 < 0 iii) β
01
4 > 0 iv) β
10
4 < 0. Attractive singles are most likely to move to the
city and least likely to leave the city. The model has no predictions on whether attractive
married individuals are more likely to move than less attractive married individuals.
We test those predictions with a set of logits estimating the probability of moving
from the countryside to the city and the reverse movement, conditional on marriage
market status, level of attractiveness, age, presence of children, employment status and an
interaction term between being single and level of attractiveness. For the ﬁrst prediction
w ec a ns i m p l yl o o ka tt h es i g na n ds i g n i ﬁcance of the estimated indicator variable for
being single. In terms of evaluating, whether more attractive singles are more likely to
move to the city than less attractive singles we have to be a bit more careful. Since the
logit model is by itself already non-linear it makes no sense to make inference on the
interaction term between single and level of attractiveness. As pointed out by e.g. Ai
and Norton (2003) the correct way to make inference in this situation is to evaluate the
cross derivative of the expected value of the dependent variable. In our application the
dependent variable takes the value 1 if a transition between the two geographical location
is observed and 0 otherwise. In the logit model the probability of a transition is modelled
as
Pr(Y =1 |S,A,X)=
exp(βSS + βAA + βASAS + βX)
1+e x p ( βSS + βAA + βASAS + βX)
= P
where X contains the other explanatory variables. In our application where the interaction
term consists of an indicator variable and a continuous variable the cross derivative is
∆∂P
∂A∆S
=( βA + βAS)[P((βA + βAS)A + βS + Xβ) × (1 − P((βA + βAS)A + βS + Xβ))]
−βA [P((βAA + Xβ) × (1 − P((βAA + Xβ))].
Obviously, this is not equal to βAS. Ai and Norton (2003) also provides consistent as-
ymptotic standard errors for the interaction terms based on the delta method. The cross
24derivative depends on the values of the other covariates and consequently, the interaction
term diﬀers across individuals. Below we therefore present both βAS and the estimated
z-statistics plotted against the predicted probability of moving to make inference of the
interaction terms.
First, we present the results for the rural to city movement. For both men and women
we see that the mobility pattern is exactly as the model predicts although for females the
eﬀects are more pronounced. Single people are most likely to move to the city. In addition
there is a strong eﬀect of level of attractiveness on the mobility from rural to city. This
eﬀect could to some extent be driven by individuals attending schools and universities. We
will return to this issue in section 5 when we examine a sample consisting of individuals
above 25 years old.
Table 4: Logit for transition from rural to city9
Men Women
Coeﬀ.s t d . C o e ﬀ. std. Coeﬀ.s t d .C o e ﬀ.s t d .
Single 0.077∗ 0.040 0.047 0.053 0.707∗∗ 0.041 0.599∗∗ 0.052
Attractiveness 0.471∗∗ 0.037 0.351∗∗ 0.038
Single*attractiveness -0.047 0.045 -0.003 0.046
# Observations 82469 75628
Note: ∗ (∗∗) denotes signiﬁcant diﬀerent from 0 at the 10% (5%) level.
In Figure 4 we plot the Z-statistics of the cross derivative against the predicted value.
A positive (negative) Z-statistic implies that the cross derivative is positive (negative) and
a value which in absolutely terms is greater than 1.96 implies that the cross derivative
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at a 5% level of signiﬁcance. For women we see that for
the great majority of observations, the interaction term is indeed positive and signiﬁcant.
For men we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant interaction terms in the relevant range.
9Note, that in this and all subsequent tables we also condition on age, presence of children and
employment status.
25Figure 4: Interaction of single and attractiveness - transition from rural to city.
Next, we consider the transition from city to rural areas. Again, the model’s predic-
tions are supported by the results - married individuals are more likely to move to rural
areas.
The results in Table 5 also suggest that the reason people move to the city is not only
to obtain higher wages. More attractive people also have higher levels of education. If
there is a higher return to education in the city that could explain why highly educated
people move there but not why highly educated people move out of the city as we ﬁnd.
Note, that for women the marriage market prediction is strongly supported. In Figure 5
we see that the probability of moving from the city to the countryside is especially lower
for the most attractive singles. For men, the interaction eﬀect also points towards this
direction but the eﬀect is insigniﬁcant at conventional levels. The results also show that
for both the transition into the city and out of the city more attractive people are more
mobile. This is consistent with other studies on individual mobility (e.g., Greenwood,
1997 and Compton & Pollak, 2004). Higher educated individuals are more likely to be
geographically mobile. In section 5 we carry out a number of robustness checks.
26Table 5: Logit for transition from city to rural
Men Women
Coeﬀ.s t d .C o e ﬀ.s t d . C o e ﬀ.s t d .C o e ﬀ. std.
Single -0.282∗∗ 0.041 -0.260∗∗ 0.056 -0.360∗∗ 0.039 -0.326∗∗ 0.050
Attractiveness 0.108∗∗ 0.028 0.083∗∗ 0.027
Single*attractiveness -0.034 0.042 -0.148∗∗ 0.042
# Observations 31607 30023
Note: ∗ (∗∗) denotes signiﬁcant diﬀerent from 0 at the 10% (5%) level.
Figure 5: Interaction of single and attractiveness - city to rural.
The results in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that the mobility ﬂows work in favor of our
marriage market hypothesis. In order to shed further light on the mobility patterns we
look in table 6 at the distribution of individuals between rural and city conditional on
their level of attractiveness at diﬀerent life stages.
27Table 6: Geographical location of individuals based on attractiveness
at different life-stages
Fraction living in city
Level of attractiveness At age 18 At marriage After 5 years of marriage
< 1st quartile 0.22 0.28 0.20
between1st and 2nd quartile 0.20 0.27 0.18
between 2nd and 3rd quartile 0.23 0.33 0.22
> 3rd quartile 0.18 0.50 0.32
Table 6 shows that at age 18 (when individuals are typically not yet operating on the
marriage market and often still live with their parents) most people live in rural areas
a n dt h e r ei sn o tal o to fd i ﬀerence between individuals at the high and the low end of the
attractiveness distribution. However, at the time of marriage, many of them live in the
city. In particular, a large share of the individuals above the third quartile have moved
to the city and married there. Amongst the individuals who stay married for 5 years we
see that a signiﬁcant fraction has moved back to the rural areas. The relative fractions
located in the countryside and the city is now very close to the pattern at age 18. Only,
the most attractive individuals prefer to live in the city, although also for this group we
see transitions from city to rural upon marriage.
4.1 Size of the segments
The model has no predictions on the correlation between AM and AF.T h e r e a r e t w o
opposing eﬀects. Cities have more and smaller segments which increases the correlation
but the fact that the attractiveness distribution is more skewed to the right10 combined
with the fact that the most attractive singles live in the city makes the correlation smaller.
The latter eﬀect basically makes the market for the high types more heterogeneous.
In this section we present evidence on the size of the marriage market segments in
cities and rural areas. First, we investigate whether diﬀerences in our attractiveness
measure between partners diﬀer between the city and rural areas. Then, we do the same
for age. The underlying assumption is here that agents prefer to marry partners within
their cohort.
To test whether couples are more alike in cities, we run four regressions at the start of
the relationship. In the ﬁrst we regress the squared diﬀerence between the attractiveness
10The skewness of the standardized attractiveness distribution is 0.102.
28of men and women on (i) a city dummy (ii) the level of attractiveness and a city dummy.
We include the level of attractiveness to correct for level eﬀects. In addition, to account for
skewness, we run a regression where we take the squared diﬀerence between the percentiles
of men and women in the distribution and regress it on level of attractiveness and a city
dummy.
Table 7: Homogeneity of matches wrt. attractiveness
Dependent variable:(AM − AF)2 Coeﬀ.S t d . e r r . C o e ﬀ. Std. err.
City 0.127 0.078 0.304∗∗ 0.056
Woman’s attractiveness -2.23∗∗ 0.026
Man’s attractiveness 1.86∗∗ 0.028
Dependent variable:(AM
P − AF
P)2
City -77.41∗∗ 34.93 -74.19∗∗ 34.903
Woman’s attractiveness, percentile -0.70 0.608
Man’s attractiveness, percentile -2.28∗∗ 0.616
# Observations 24812
Note: ∗ (∗∗) denotes signiﬁcant diﬀerent from 0 at the 10% (5%) level.
The squared diﬀerence between the attractiveness of men and women is not lower in
the city. However, because the attractiveness distribution is right skewed the distance
between two individuals in the high end of the attractiveness distribution is potentially
larger than between two individuals in the low end of the distribution. Since attractive
people are more likely to live in the city this biases the coeﬃcient on the city dummy
u p w a r d .T oo v e r c o m et h i si s s u ew ea l s ol o o ka tt h es q u a r e dd i ﬀerence of the percentiles
of the attractiveness distributions. In this regression individuals are placed in percentiles
and the diﬀerence in percentiles squared is the dependent variable. In this regression the
squared diﬀerence is signiﬁcantly lower in the city. Suggesting that market segmentation
is indeed tighter in the city.
Next, we turn to age. Consider the following expression:
∆ =
¡
Age
M − Age
F − E
¡
Age
M − Age
F¢¢2
.
If search frictions are smaller in the city and people prefer to marry in their own cohort
than the segments must be smaller as well. Table 8 presents the results for age at the
time the relationship starts:
29Table 8: Homogeneity of matches wrt. age
City Rural
Mean Std. error Mean Std. error
∆ 22.53 0.53 26.72 0.43
# Observations 8934 15878
Diﬀerence in means is -4.19 with a standard error of 0.70.
In cities, age diﬀerences between married couples are signiﬁcantly smaller than in the
rural areas which is supporting the prediction from our theoretical model that matching
is more tight in the city.
5 Alternative explanations and robustness checks11
In this section we carry out a number of sensitivity checks and test whether our results
can be driven by other factors. First we test whether the inﬂow of singles into the city
merely reﬂects a “college eﬀect”, second we experiment with diﬀerent attractiveness and
city deﬁnitions, third we test whether the fact that couples move out of the city is mainly
due to the presence of children and ﬁnally we test whether our results could be driven by
life cycle motives.
5.1 Going to the city to get a college education
In Denmark, most universities are located in the big cities so we must worry about whether
our results are driven by youngsters who move into the city to get an education, get mar-
ried and then move back to the countryside. First, this story is not necessary inconsistent
with our marriage market model because colleges and universities are good marriage
markets themselves because they select a fairly homogeneous group of highly educated
individuals (see e.g. Goldin, 1992 and Goldin & Katz, 2002). Nevertheless, it is still useful
to check whether our model would also work in the absence of colleges. We can do this
by restricting the sample to individuals who are older than 25 years. The motivation for
those individuals to move to the city cannot be the presence of colleges. The results of
this exercise are presented in Table 9 and 10 and in Figure 6 and 7.
11In all the tables in this section we also condition on age, presence of children and whether the
individual works full-time.
30Table 9: Logit for transition from rural to city, older than 25
Men Women
Coeﬀ.s t d .C o e ﬀ.s t d . C o e ﬀ.s t d .C o e ﬀ.s t d .
Single 0.377∗∗ 0.054 0.391∗∗ 0.073 1.133∗∗ 0.060 1.087∗∗ 0.082
Attractiveness 0.477∗∗ 0.048 0.302∗∗ 0.057
Single*attractiveness -0.045 0.062 0.067 0.074
# Observations 50832 45979
Note: ∗ (∗∗) denotes signiﬁcant diﬀerent from 0 at the 10% (5%) level.
Figure 6: Interaction of single and attractiveness for individuals above 25 years old -
transition from rural to city.
Table 10: Logit for transition from city to rural, older than 25
Men Women
Coeﬀ.s t d .C o e ﬀ.s t d . C o e ﬀ.s t d .C o e ﬀ. std.
Single -0.261∗∗ 0.049 -0.258∗∗ 0.068 -0.450∗∗ 0.049 -0.375∗∗ 0.067
Attractiveness 0.138∗∗ 0.032 0.126∗∗ 0.033
Single*attractiveness -0.043 0.050 -0.161∗∗ 0.056
# observations 20851 18840
Note: ∗ (∗∗) denotes signiﬁcant diﬀerent from 0 at the 10% (5%) level
31Figure 7: Interaction of single and attractiveness for individuals above 25 years old -
transition from city to rural.
The results are now much cleaner in favour of our model in terms of describing the
transition from city to rural. This suggest that the mobility of individuals to the large
cities is not explained solely by educational choices.
5.2 Other attractiveness and city measures
S i n c ee d u c a t i o ni st h em o s ti m p o r t a n tc o m p o n e n ti no u ra t t r a c t i v e n e s sm e a s u r ew eh a v e
repeated our analysis with education only. We only present the results from regressions
with all variables.
32Table 11: Logit for transition between rural and city
Rural to city City to rural
Men Women Men Women
Coeﬀ.s t d .C o e ﬀ.s t d . C o e ﬀ.s t d .C o e ﬀ.s t d .
Single 0.479∗∗ 0.155 0.801∗∗ 0.173 -0.144 0.061 0.006 0.137
Education 0.399∗∗ 0.055 0.206∗∗ 0.060 0.231∗∗ 0.035 0.207∗∗ 0.034
Single*education -0.047 0.071 0.160∗∗ 0.079 -0.055 0.055 -0.220∗∗ 0.060
# Observations 77377 75869 33994 31588
Note: ∗ (∗∗) denotes signiﬁcant diﬀerent from 0 at the 10% (5%) level
This does not change any of our conclusions.
Figure 8: Interaction of single and education - transition from rural to city.
33Figure 9: Interaction of single and level of education - transition form city to rural.
In addition, we have repeated our analysis for dense and non-dense areas (measured
b yp e o p l ep e rs q u a r em i l e )r a t h e rt h a nf o rt h el a r g e s tc i t i e sv e r s u st h ec o u n t r y s i d ea n d
again, this does not aﬀect our results.
Below we present results for the model where city is deﬁned as municipalities with a
population density above 500 persons per square kilometer. Now 36 % of the population
lives in the city. This deﬁnition implies that a number of the suburbs of Copenhagen is
also included in the city deﬁnition.
Table 12: Logit for transition from rural to city(>500 persons per km2)
Men Women
Coeﬀ.s t d .C o e ﬀ.s t d . C o e ﬀ.s t d .C o e ﬀ.s t d .
Single 0.187∗∗ 0.048 0.251∗∗ 0.063 0.777∗∗ 0.046 0.688∗∗ 0.058
Attractiveness 0.488∗∗ 0.044 0.387∗∗ 0.042
Single*attractiveness 0.035 0.053 0.017 0.052
# Observations 72910 67059
Note: ∗ (∗∗) denotes signiﬁcant diﬀerent from 0 at the 10% (5%) level
34Figure 10: Interaction of single and attractiveness - transition from rural to city (>500
persons per km2).
Table 13: Logit for transition between city(>500 persons per km2)a n d
rural
Men Women
Coeﬀ.s t d .C o e ﬀ.s t d . C o e ﬀ.s t d .C o e ﬀ. std.
Single -0.198∗∗ 0.048 -0.230∗∗ 0.064 -0.269∗∗ 0.044 -0.266∗∗ 0.056
Attractiveness 0.084∗∗ 0.033 0.016 0.031
Single*attractiveness -0.091∗∗ 0.048 -0.145∗∗ 0.047
# Observations 41166 38592
Note: ∗ (∗∗) denotes signiﬁcant diﬀerent from 0 at the 10% (5%) level
35Figure 11: Interaction of single and attractiveness - transition from city (>500 persons
per km2)t or u r a l .
Again, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant changes in our conclusions. In fact, the interaction eﬀect
is now even more in favor of the marriage market hypothesis, since for both women and
men we ﬁnd signiﬁcantly positive eﬀects for the transition from rural to city.
5.3 The role of children
Although we control for having children, married couples could still move to rural areas
because they expect to get kids. In that case, the reason to move to the countryside
reﬂects more of a shift towards more space and not the fact that one looses the beneﬁts
of lower search-costs. In order to isolate the search motivation, we only consider the
subset of couples who never get children. Under the assumption that having no kids
reﬂects preferences rather than constraints, this group must have other motives than kids
to move to the countryside.
36Table 14: Logit for transition from city to rural, No kids sample
Men Women
Coeﬀ.s t d .C o e ﬀ.s t d . C o e ﬀ.s t d .C o e ﬀ. std.
Single -0.322∗∗ 0.087 -0.428∗∗ 0.130 -0.345∗∗ 0.095 -0.373∗∗ 0.134
Attractiveness -0.253∗∗ 0.107 0.021 0.099
Single*attractiveness 0.333∗∗ 0.123 -0.159 0.128
# Observations 6125 4383
Note: ∗ (∗∗) denotes signiﬁcant diﬀerent from 0 at the 10% (5%) level
The absence of kids does not change the pattern that married people are more likely
to move to the countryside than their unmarried counterparts.
Figure 12: Interaction of single and attractiveness - transition from city to rural for no
kids sample.
5.4 Life cycle motives for leaving the city
Perhaps, the mobility pattern that we ﬁnd can be described by “ordinary” life cycle
behavior. People enter the city when they are young and have relatively strong preferences
for bars, clubs, cinemas and other city amenities and then leave the city when they are
37older and richer and have stronger preferences for land. One way to “isolate” the search
eﬀect is to consider the mobility patterns of couples who have moved to the country
site and who got divorced there. If they moved to the countryside for life cycle motives
other than the marriage market, we expect them to stay in the countryside after divorce
whereas according to the marriage market model they should move back to the city once
they become single again. We ﬁnd that our model still holds. Since the observations we
use are annual, we only know that a divorce has occurred during the year but not the
exact date. We therefore present results for both individuals who are divorced 1 year and
those who are still divorced after 2 years.
Table 15: Logit for transition from rural to city
Men Women
Coeﬀ.S t d C o e ﬀ.S t d C o e ﬀ.S t d .C o e ﬀ.S t d .
Divorced, 1 year 0.765∗∗ 0.061 0.667∗∗ 0.085 1.141∗∗ 0.059 1.059∗∗ 0.078
Attractiveness 0.447∗∗ 0.021 0.359∗∗ 0.023
Divorced∗attractiveness -0.115 0.086 0.027 0.075
Divorced, 2 years 0.477∗∗ 0.084 0.486∗∗ 0.115 0.497∗∗ 0.097 0.454∗∗ 0.127
Attractiveness 0.437∗∗ 0.021 0.353∗∗ 0.022
Divorced∗attractiveness 0.023 0.114 0.108 0.119
# Observations 82469 75628
Note: ∗ (∗∗) denotes signiﬁcant diﬀerent from 0 at the 10% (5%) level
38Figure 13: Interaction of divorcee for 1 year and attractiveness - transition from rural to
city.
Figure 14: Interaction of divorcee for 2 years and attractiveness - transition from rural
to city.
39Table 16: Logit for transition from city to rural
Men Women
Coeﬀ.S t d .C o e ﬀ.S t d . C o e ﬀ.S t d . C o e ﬀ.S t d .
Divorced, 1 year 0.734∗∗ 0.063 0.747∗∗ 0.087 0.631∗∗ 0.063 0.726∗∗ 0.079
Attractiveness 0.097∗∗ 0.022 0.032 0.022
Divorced∗attractiveness 0.057 0.076 -0.020 0.071
Divorced, 2 years 0.127 0.092 0.102 0.128 -0.374∗∗ 0.112 -0.267∗ 0.138
Attractiveness 0.107∗∗ 0.021 0.029 0.021
Divorced∗attractiveness -0.215∗∗ 0.118 -0.137 0.127
# Observations 31607 30023
Note: ∗ (∗∗) denotes signiﬁcant diﬀerent from 0 at the 10% (5%) level
Figure 15: Interaction of divorcee for 1 year and attractiveness - transition from city to
rural.
40Figure 16: Interaction of divorcee for 2 years and attractiveness - transition from city to
rural.
Not surprisingly, because of the nature of a divorce, divorcees are more likely to move.
Therefore we must compare the likelihood to move to the city with the likelihood to move
out of the city. For men, there is no large diﬀerence after the ﬁrst year of divorce. In
the second year after divorce they are however more likely to move to the city, but not
to the rural areas compared to the referenceg r o u p . F o rw o m e n ,t h ep r o p e n s i t yo ft h e
divorced to move to the city is larger than to move out of the city12.T h i s p a t t e r n i s
even more pronounced after 2 years of divorce and can be explained by the fact that it is
typically harder to ﬁnd a place to live in the city than on the countryside. This supports
the marriage market hypothesis.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we extend the Burdett-Coles (1997) marriage market model with a distinc-
tion between eﬃcient marriage markets (cities) and less eﬃcient search markets (rural
12Although this is evident from the size of the coeﬃcients we have also investigated the marginal eﬀects
of being divorced. The marginal eﬀects (available upon request) supports the claim.
41areas) and derive how individuals sort into those markets. Our model predicts that sin-
gles and in particular attractive singles move to the city while couples move out of the
city. Those predictions are conﬁrmed by the data. We ﬁnd that in particular for females,
the cross partial of single and attractiveness on the probability of moving is positive and
statistically signiﬁcant. Why the cross eﬀect is less pronounced for males is still an open
issue.
In this paper we solely focussed on marriage decisions and abstracted from divorces.
One interesting motivation for married couples to move to a rural area is that it is an
eﬃcient way to make a commitment. Burdett et al. (2004) showed that if one of the
partners is likely to continue searching “on the job”, this by itself stimulates the other
partner to continue search as well. Given the many long term investments that are
required, like raising children and buying a house, which all require a stable relationship,
it can be eﬃcient to move to an ineﬃcient search market to limit “on the job” search.
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